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Along with several structural reforms, Chile embarked upon a major income tax 
reform in the eighties. Its basic feature was a significant reduction in the corporate income 
tax rate. The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically the link between the tax 
reform and the investment performance of Chile since the reform. Macroeconomic and 
microeconomic evidence is found to be consistent with the hypothesis of the reduction in 
the corporate income tax as being one of the determinants of the investment boom of the 
late eighties and nineties in Chile. Macro data for the period 1975-2003 are used and the 
evidence indicates that the tax reform explains an increase in private investment of three 
percentage points of the GDP. On the other hand, information on 87 publicly held 
companies is used to construct a panel for the period 1980-2002. The microeconomic 
evidence confirms that investment was positively affected by the tax reform. 
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1. Introduction 
 
  Chile experienced an investment boom starting in the mid-1980’s. Private 
investment went from 12% of GDP in 1985 to 18% of GDP in 1990 and 23% in the mid-
nineties. Along with many other market-oriented reforms, Chile undertook a tax reform that 
substantially reduced the corporate income tax. Tax on retained earnings was lowered from 
more than 50% in the early 1980s to 10% later in that decade. 
  The period between 1985 and 1997 is considered the “golden age” of the Chilean 
economy. GDP grew 7.6% on average and the percentage of the population below the 
poverty line was reduced from 40% to about 20%. This period coincides with the tax 
reform and the investment boom. But Chile also undertook several other  reforms that aimed 
at having a more proper market economy and at increasing the rate of economic growth.
1 
Some simple growth accounting shows that capital accumulation explains about one-third 
of the higher growth in Chile during this period (Vergara, 2003). 
  The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically the link between the tax 
reform and the investment performance of Chile in 1975-2003. Figure 1 shows both the 
corporate income tax and private investment during this period. The corporate income t ax 
rate began to fall in 1984, which is about the same time when private investment starts to 
show an upward trend that would last until the late nineties. On the other hand, the previous 
literature on this matter has produced mixed results. Hsieh and Parker (2002) present 
evidence that the reduction in tax on retained earnings increased the amount of funds 
available to constrained firms, hence producing an investment surge in these companies. 
                                                  
1 See Larraín and Vergara (2001).   2 
They argue that in countries with poorly developed financial markets, the taxation of 
retained profits removes internal funds from some firms where the marginal value of these 
funds exceeds the real interest rate. In this manner, a lower tax can have a significant effect 
on investment and growth. Medina and Valdés (1998) find that the availability of internal 
funds is a key determinant in the investment decisions of companies. In this case, the tax on 
retained earnings would negatively affect investment. However, they do not test directly for 
this effect. 
  Bustos et al. (2004) use a panel of 83 publicly held firms during 1985-1995 and 
make calculations of the user’s cost of capital.
2 They conclude that taxes have very little 
effect on the desired capital stock because they are offset by the fact that the tax code 
allows  for the deduction of interest and depreciation. This is not inconsistent with Hsieh 
and Parker since Bustos et al. use a panel of firms that are supposedly not financially 
constrained. In contrast, it seems inconsistent with Medina and Valdés given that both 
studies use the same data set. Although the work is interesting, there might be some 
features not captured by this methodology, which casts some doubts on the results. First, 
the tax code is sometimes much more complicated than just simple rules about t he tax rate, 
the depreciation allowances and interest payments. Most of the times taxes actually paid are 
difficult to replicate by simple formulas.
3 If this were the case, it would be more accurate to 
use the tax rate directly instead of a simple version  of the user’s cost of capital. If the 
evidence shows that changes in the tax rate significantly affect investment, it would also be 
                                                  
2 Jorgenson (1963), Hall & Jorgenson (1967). 
3 For instance, there are tax credits, allowances for new projects, taxes on interest and taxes on capital gains, 
among others, that make the analysis more complicated. In addition, the user’s cost of capital is different if 
there are liquidity constraints, debt overhang problems and the like.   3 
indirect proof that they also affect the user’s cost of capital (measured properly). Second, in 
its pure form, this methodology assumes that if the project has losses at the beginning, the 
government will refund taxes. It is the usual practice that firms can carry forward losses but 
not that they get refunds for those losses when they occur. This small difference can have a 
significant impact on the present value of a project and hence, on the investment decision of 
a firm.  Third, the rate of discount used for depreciation allowances has also been a matter 
of debate. Summers (1988) argues, based on evidence from 200 major corporations in the 
USA, that there is little basis for confidence in tax policy assessments relying upon specific 
assumed discount rates that are constant across companies. If this were the case, the return 
demanded on marginal projects would vary by much more  across firms than do 
conventional capital cost measures.  Finally, it is difficult to believe that in practice, capital 
accumulation would be the same regardless of whether the corporate tax rate is 1% or 99%, 
which is a result derived from this analysis. 
  On theoretical grounds, most models indicate that higher taxes should reduce the 
desired capital stock. However, there are cases (such as the user’s cost model) where it is 
not always so and, depending upon certain parameters, it is possible for the desired capital 
stock to increase as taxes rise. This mixed result derived from the theoretical literature is 
why recent literature has focused on empirical estimates. In this paper I present 
macroeconomic and microeconomic evidence on this matter for Chile in  the last three 
decades. 
  The tax reform in Chile was implemented with the explicit objective of increasing 
private investment. There were two types of arguments in regard to the reduction of the tax   4 
rate for private investment. On the one hand, it was argued that a lower corporate income 
tax rate would reduce the cost of capital, thus increasing investment. On the other hand, 
there was the sense that lower taxes would increase funds available for firms and then 
induce firms to invest more.
4 
  The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I briefly discuss some theoretical 
models as well as empirical investment equations for developing countries. In section 3, 
macroeconomic evidence is presented to find out whether the reduction in corporate income 
taxes in Chile is related to the investment boom. 
  Section 4 presents microeconomic evidence on the subject. A panel of 87 publicly 
held companies is used for 1980-2002 to see whether the reduction in the tax rates caused 
an effect on their investment. The results are consistent with the macro evidence. Both the 
macro and micro evidence show that the tax reform of the 1980s had a significant positive 
effect on private investment. Section 5 presents my conclusion. 
 
2. Investment equations for developing countries 
  In a neoclassical model, investment decisions are modeled assuming a 
representative firm that produces a good Y using capital (K) and labor (L). Supposing a 
very simple model, this firm maximizes the present value of the shareholders’ dividends: 
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4 This second argument is the same argument used by Hsieh and Parker (op. cit.).   5 
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where r is the interest rate, t is the corporate income tax rate, b is the fraction of investment 
financed with debt, z is the present value of the depreciation allowances, for tax purposes, 
of $1 invested today, p is the price of investment and I is investment. 
From the first order conditions we find that the marginal product of capital is equal 
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Equation (3) states t hat the desired level of capital depends on its user’s cost. The user’s 
cost, in turn, depends on the tax rate. But it depends on the tax rate in two different ways. 
On the one hand, a higher tax rate directly increases the cost of capital, reducing the desired 
capital stock. On the other hand, the fact that interest and depreciation are discounted for 
tax purposes reduces the cost of capital. In theory, if (b+z) is equal to one, then taxes do not 
affect the desired capital stock.5  The classical example is when there is no debt (b = 0) and 
taxes are on the firm’s cash flow (meaning that investment is depreciated instantaneously, 
i.e. z = 1). In this case: 
 
                                                  
5 Bustos et al. (op. cit.) estimate b and z and conclude that their sum is close to one.   6 
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which implies that taxes are not relevant in the determination of the optimal stock of 
capital. It could also be the case that (b+z) > 1, which implies that the cost of capital 
decreases as taxes increase. 
Although these cases are theoretically plausible, it could be misleading to consider 
such a simple tax code as the relevant one in investment decisions. In the case of Chile, 
there are taxes on capital gains, on interest, tax credits for investments, different types of 
depreciation, special rules for small firms, etc, which make it very difficult to draw 
conclusions from s uch a simple rule. In addition, in a developing country there might be a 
large number of firms that are liquidity-constrained, which implies that the user’s cost of 
capital is only part of the whole story.  Arguments such as the debt overhang could also 
affect the relevant cost of capital. 
This is the reason why the strategy followed in this paper for the empirical 
estimations is to use directly the tax rate and other components of the user’s cost of capital, 
such as the interest rate and the expected change in the price of capital. This is done both 
for the macroeconomic estimations as well as for the panel of firms (microeconomic 
estimations). Income taxes actually paid by firms are also used for the microeconomic 
estimations. As there is no long series of aggregate corporate taxes available, it is not 
possible to use corporate tax revenues in the macroeconomic regressions. 
  Let us assume a CES production function: 
   7 
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The desired stock of capital as a fraction of output is obtained from (5). It depends 
on the cost of capital. This, in turn, depends on the interest rate, taxes and the expected 
change in the price of capital (equation 3).  Usually, the models assume that there are 
adjustment costs which, along with the accumulation identity ( ) K I K d - = D ,  allow the 
lagged investment to be introduced to the investment equations.  
  Investment equations for developing countries usually include other variables that 
may be derived as well as more restrictions or variables in the theoretical model. For 
instance, since the work of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), it has been accepted that 
financial deepening might be an important determinant to investment. The lack of a 
properly developed financial market introduces credit constraints that affect investment. 
This is clearly more important for developing than for d eveloped countries. Larraín and 
Vergara (1993) find evidence of credit constraints being a significant factor determining to   8 
investment in East Asian countries. Cardoso (1993) finds similar evidence for Latin 
American countries. Medina and Valdés (op.cit.) show that internal cash flow is an 
important determinant to investment in Chilean firms, suggesting the presence of liquidity 
constraints. In theoretical models, a constraint is imposed so that investment expenditures 
are bound by the availability of funds (Rama, 1993). 
  From a macroeconomic point of view, the foreign debt burden can also be an 
important determinant in investment. There are at least three channels for this effect. First, 
a large debt requires large foreign payments, which, under conditions of limited foreign 
financing, lead to a reduction in investment. Secondly, a large foreign debt can be seen as a 
source of potential tax increases that reduces the return on investment. Third, a high foreign 
debt can be seen as a source of macro instability. As its burden depends on uncertain world 
economic conditions (such as world interest rates, terms of trade and other variables that 
are beyond the control of the country), it will have an effect on economic policy decisions. 
Empirical evidence of this effect has been found for Latin America, Asia and a larger group 
of developing countries (Servén and Solimano, 1993). From a firm’s perspective, a larger 
debt burden reduces the funds available for investment in the presence of liquidity 
constraints. As the firm becomes riskier, it also increases its relevant interest rate. 
  Political and economic instability also play a major role in investment decisions. 
The irreversibility literature has put emphasis on the cost of an irreversible investment in an 
uncertain scenario as compared to the value of waiting. The more unstable the economic 
environment, the greater the effect on investment. The empirical literature for developing   9 
countries has used variables (such as exchange rate volatility, inflation volatility and the 
like) to capture uncertainty.
6 
  Public investment is another variable that has usually been included in private 
investment equations. The traditional view is that public investment crowds our private 
investment. However, it could also be argued that public investment, specially in 
infrastructure, is a complement to private investment. In other words, the public capital 
stock enters the production function and increases the productivity of private investment. 
This effect has been found to be significant in different studies on developing countries 
(Servén and Solimano, op.cit.). 
 
3. Macroeconomic Evidence 
  Investment equations for Chile were estimated for the period 1975-2003 using 
annual data. This covers the period in which the corporate income tax was reduced 
significantly. It went from 50% in the first few years to 10% in the second half of the 80% 
and to 0% in 1989. Then it was increased to 15% in 1990. The tax reform of 2001 increased 
the corporate income tax from 15% to 17% in a three-year period. It rose to 16% in 2002, to 
16.5% in 2003 and to 17% in 2004.  
Private investment  was calculated as the difference between total capital formation and 
public investment. Capital formation data were obtained from national accounts and public 
investment d ata from the Budget Office. Both are in real terms (CH$ of 1996). Public 
investment was deflated by the same deflator as total capital formation. Private and public 
                                                  
6 See Rama (op. cit.), Larraín and Vergara (1993), Cardoso (op.cit.).   10 
investment are expressed as a percentage of both GDP and the stock of capital. The stock of 
capital is obtained from the Ministry of Finance (2001). 
The credit granted by the banking system to the private sector as a percentage of GDP 
was used as a proxy for credit constraints. The credit data were obtained from the IMF. A 
series of foreign debt minus international reserves was used to take the debt overhang 
argument into account. The source of these data is the Central Bank of Chile. The variable 
is expressed as a percentage of GDP.  The lagged variable was used in both cases to avoid 
possible problems with simultaneity. 
 The interest rate corresponds to the real rate for deposits from 90 days to 1 year. The 
data for interest rates on deposits are of better quality in Chile than the data for interest 
rates on loans. Furthermore, official series f or rates on loans exist only since 1980. Taking 
into account that, according to different studies on the Chilean economy,
7 changes in 
interest rates have a lagging affect on aggregate spending, the interest rate in (t-1) is used 
for our estimations. 
  The r elative price of capital goods is defined as the investment deflator divided by 
the GDP deflator. The relevant variable (see equation 3) that affects investment is the 
expected change in this variable. Perfect foresight is assumed, i.e. each year the expected 
variation in the relative price of capital is equal to the actual variation. 
  The regressions are presented in Table 1. In the first two equations, the dependent 
variable is private investment as a percentage of GDP while in the second two, it is private 
                                                  
7 Mies et al. (2002) provide a comprehensive summary of the different studies made on the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism in Chile.  They find a lag of between one and four quarters, depending upon the 
period considered. Other studies find longer lags.   11 
investment as a percentage of the capital stock. In equation (1), all the coefficients have the 
expected sign
8 and are significant, with the exception of private credit, which is not.  Public 
investment appears to be a substitute for private investment. The tax variable has a negative 
sign and it is significant. The coefficient indicates that for each 10 points that the tax rate 
decreases, private investment as a percentage of GDP increases by 0.57 percentage points 
in the short term and by 0.9 percentage points in the long term.  
In equation (2), we took out the credit variable, which is not significant in equation 
1. The rest of the coefficients basically remain unchanged. The coefficient associated with 
the tax rate remains virtually the same. This means that the tax reform in the mid-eighties 
that, after some changes in between,  reduced the corporate income tax rate from 50% to 
15%, caused,  ceteris paribus, an increase in private investment of 2 percentage points of 
the GDP in the short term and of 3.1 percentage points of the GDP in the long term. If we 
take 1980 as the starting point, this means that the reform is responsible for approximately 
40% of the total increase in private investment between that year and the mid-nineties.  
  The real exchange rate volatility, defined as the coeffcient of the variation in the real 
exchange rate, was used as a proxy for uncertainty, but it did not turn out to be significant. 
  As some variables show changes in levels, there is a presumption that some of them 
might be non-stationary.  The degree of integration of the individual variables was checked 
using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. It was verified that some of them are indeed I(1). 
Then co-integration among the variables was reviewed. A straightforward approach is to 
                                                  
8 In the case of public investment, the expected sign is ambiguous since the traditional view is that it crowds 
out private investment; however, it could also be argued that at least some type of public investment (for 
instance, in infrastructure) is complementary to private investment.   12 
conduct a unit root test for the estimated residuals. The null hypothesis of no co-integration 
was rejected at  a1% level with a t statistics of -4.8. 
  A battery of tests was run to check for the properties of the residuals. They indicate 
the absence of autocorrelation (Lagrange Multiplier test) and heteroskedasticity (White test) 
as well as normality in the residuals (Jarque-Bera). Stability tests (CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ) also indicate a stable equation. 
  In equations 3 and 4, we check our results using the dependent variable of private 
investment as a percentage of the capital stock. In fact, this is the dependent variable in 
most of the theoretical models. To be consistent, we use public investment also as a 
percentage of the total capital stock. The  result confirms that private investment is 
negatively affected by higher corporate tax rates. In this case, however, both public 
investment and the interest rate became non significant. 
Like in the first two regressions, we check for co-integration. The unit root test for 
the residuals rejects the hypothesis of no co-integration. We also check that the properties 
of the residuals are the desired ones. 
  In summary, the macroeconomic evidence is consistent regarding the effect of taxes 
on investment in Chile  in the period 1975-2003. Indeed, it shows that the lower corporate 




   13 
4. Microeconomic evidence 
  The next step is to obtain microeconomic evidence from a large group of firms. We 
use a panel of publicly held firms, those that publish Standardized Financial Reports
9 
between 1980 and 2002. Data before 1980 are scarce and generally not comparable with the 
data after that year. The panel consists of the 87  firms that had information in 1980 and that 
still exist and have information today. The frequency is annual.  
  The dependent variable is the ratio of investment to fixed assets. Investment is 
defined as the difference between fixed assets in t and fixed assets in (t-1), adjusted by 
depreciation.  In order to have both current and lagged fixed assets in currency for the same 
year, fixed assets in (t-1) are indexed by the inflation rate (CPI) of t.
10  Hence, investment is 
constructed as: 
t t t t t dep FA FA I + + - = - ) 1 ( 1 p  
where FA corresponds to fixed assets and dep stands for depreciation. In the denominator, 
we use fixed assets in t-1 inflated by the CPI. 
  The same approach followed in the previous section is used for the explanatory 
variables.   To capture the liquidity constraint effect, we use the operating profits in (t-1) 
divided by fixed assets in t-1. The debt effect is captured by the ratio of debt to total assets 
(both in t -1). The interest rate is also used as an explanatory variable. Real GDP growth is 
used to capture the general macroeconomic conditions. For the tax variable we use, like in 
                                                  
9 Spanish acronym: FECU. 
10 Medina and Valdés (op. cit) index fixed assets in (t-1) by the investment deflator. However, in Chile, 
balance sheets are indexed by the CPI inflation rate. For instance, if there is neither depreciation nor new 
investment, then fixed assets in t will be equal to fixed assets in (t-1) indexed by the inflation rate in t. This is 
the reason why, for the purpose of comparing fixed assets in two different periods in Chile,  it is more 
appropriate to use the inflation rate as the price index.    14 
the previous section, the statutory tax rate. Here, however, we also use taxes actually paid 
by firms as a percentage of before-tax profits. 
  One of  the problems with this large microeconomic data set is that there are some 
firms that have huge jumps in some variables in particular years, specifically in their fixed 
assets. Most of these jumps are due to changes in accounting practices. Fortunately, in this 
data set there are very few of these observations, but in order to avoid spurious results, we 
decided to eliminate these extreme cases by suppressing 1% of the observations that had the 
highest increase in fixed assets and 1% that had the highest decline in fixed assets.
11  This 
allows us to work with observations not contaminated by exogenous changes in accounting 
practices. 
  The panel regressions are estimated using fixed effects. The results are shown in 
Table 2. The tax variable in these regressions is the statutory tax rate. The coefficient of this 
variable has a negative sign and it is significant, confirming the conclusions obtained with 
the macroeconomic evidence. The interest rate and the debt ratio are, as expected, negative 
and significant. L agged GDP growth is positive and significant. The operating profits are 
insignificant, which suggests the absence of liquidity constraints in these firms. However, it 
could be the case that the debt ratio, in addition to capturing the debt burden effect, is also 
capturing some liquidity constraint effect. Indeed, the larger the debt, the less funds 
available for new investment. 
                                                  
11 In practice, this means eliminating observations where fixed assets increased more than five-fold in one 
year and  observations where fixed assets declined by more than 70% in one year.   15 
 As opposed to the macroeconomic results, the variation in the investment deflator 
is not significant in this case. Different measures of macroeconomic instability (such as the 
real exchange rate volatility) did not prove to be significant. 
  A second exercise (Table 3) was conducted, but using actual taxes paid by the firms 
instead of the statutory tax rate. Taxes actually paid are expressed as a percentage of 
before-tax profits. The appeal of this variable is that the taxes actually paid by each firm are 
the best proxy for the tax burden since they consider all the numerous details and 
exceptions of the tax code. However, there is a p roblem with the variable itself and with the 
interpretation of the coefficient. Indeed, there are many cases where taxes are positive 
while after-tax profits are negative. The variable is then negative, suggesting a low tax 
burden, while in practice it is  exactly the opposite (positive taxes with negative profits). For 
this reason, the decision was made to eliminate all the negative observations for these 
particular estimations. This is why instead of 1795 observations, the regressions in Table 3 
use 1501 o bservations. Although many observations are missing, the estimated coefficient 
is not subject to misinterpretation. A larger value means higher taxes. Thus, a negative 
coefficient indicates that higher taxes reduce investment. 
  The results presented in Table 3 show that the tax variable is negative and 
significant, indicating that higher taxes reduce investment. Like in the previous regressions, 
the interest rate and the debt ratio are, as expected, negative and significant. Lagged GDP 
growth is positive and significant. The operating profits do not prove significant. 
  The regressions in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the corporate tax variable is likely to 
affect private investment in Chile through two channels. On the one hand, higher taxes   16 
increase the cost  of capital, hence reducing the desired stock of capital and investment. This 
effect is more likely to be captured by the statutory tax rate in the regressions in Table 2. 
On the other hand, higher taxes reduce funds available for investment. This effect is 
captured when taxes actually paid are used as the tax variable (Table 3). Although the fact 
that operating profits are not significant in the regressions seems to be contradictory with 
the liquidity constraint interpretation, it is possible, as explained  above, that the debt burden 
variable is capturing the liquidity constraint effect. 
  Both tax variables are included in equation 4 of Table 3: the tax rate and taxes 
actually paid. Both are negative and significant. This indicates, as suggested before, that 




  Along with several structural reforms, Chile embarked upon a major income tax 
reform in the eighties. The corporate income tax was significantly reduced from 50% at the 
beginning of the decade to 10% in the second half of the 1980’s, and even to 0% for a 
single year in 1989. In 1990, the corporate income tax was raised to 15% and recently to 
17%. From the mid-eighties to the late 1990’s, the macroeconomic performance of Chile 
was impressive by almost any standard. GDP growth averaged 7.6% between 1985 and 
1997 while unemployment and inflation dropped in a scenario of overall macroeconomic 
stability. Private investment showed an impressive performance, climbing from 12% of 
GDP in 1984-86 to 22.5% of GDP in 1995-97.   17 
  This paper addresses the issue of the relationship between the corporate income tax 
reform and the performance of private investment. Macroeconomic and microeconomic 
evidence is found to be consistent with the hypothesis that the reduction in the corporate 
income tax is one of the determinants in the investment boom. Macroeconomic evidence 
for the period 1975-2003 in Chile indicates that the tax reform explains an increase in 
private investment of three percentage points of the GDP.  
  Information on 87 publicly held companies is used to construct a panel for the 
period 1980-2002. The microeconomic evidence confirms that investment was positively 
affected by the tax reform. Either with the  statutory tax rate or with taxes actually paid by 
firms, we found that lower taxes induced a higher private investment ratio. Our estimations 
indicate that there are two channels in which taxes affect investment: on the one hand, 
higher taxes increase the  cost of capital (cost of capital channel); and on the other, they 
reduce internal funds available for investment (liquidity constraint channel). 
   18 
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Estimated Results: Macroeconomic Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable  Private Investment as         
a % of GDP 
Private Investment as                   
a % of capital stock 
V Va ar ri ia ab bl le e    E Eq qu ua at ti io on n   1 1    E Eq qu ua at ti io on n   2 2    E Eq qu ua at ti io on n   3 3    E Eq qu ua at ti io on n   4 4   
21.00**  20.85**  9.71**  9.55** 
C Co on ns st ta an nt t      
(5.83)  (5.86)  (4.76)  (4.69) 
0.39**  0.36**  -  -  P Pr ri iv va at te e   I In nv ve es st tm me en nt t   a as s   a a   % %   o of f   G GD DP P   i in n                  
t t- -1 1    (2.53)  (2.44)  -  - 
-  -  0.46**  0.41**  P Pr ri iv va at te e   I In nv ve es st tm me en nt t   a as s   a a   % %   o of f   c ca ap pi it ta al l   
s st to oc ck k   i in n         t t- -1 1    -  -  (2.90)  (2.71) 
-6.60**  -7.05**  -3.56**  -3.92** 
N Ne et t   F Fo or re ei ig gn n   D De eb bt t   i in n   t t- -1 1   
(-4.42)  (-5.17)  (-3.83)  (-4.52) 
-1.02*  -0.99*  -  - 
P Pu ub bl li ic c   I In nv ve es st tm me en nt t   a as s   a a   % %   o of f   G GD DP P   
(-1.83)  (-1.81)  -  - 
-  -  -1.38  -1.34     P Pu ub bl li ic c   I In nv ve es st tm me en nt t   a as s   a a   % %   o of f   c ca ap pi it ta al l   
s st to oc ck k    -  -  (-1.59)  (-1.55) 
-0.06*  -0.06*  -0.04**  -0.04** 
T Ta ax x   R Ra at te e   
(-1.94)  (-1.94)  (-2.41)  (-2.41) 
0.07*  0.07*  0.04*  0.04* 
I In nv ve es st tm me en nt t   D De ef fl la at to or r   ( (% %   c ch ha an ng ge e) )         
(1.96)  (2.03)  (1.99)  (2.07) 
-0.26**  -0.25*  -0.11  -0.09 
I In nt te er re es st t   R Ra at te e   i in n   t t- -1 1   
(-2.09)  (-2.00)  (-1.55)  (-1.38) 
-0.01  -  -0.01  - 
P Pr ri iv va at te e   C Cr re ed di it t   i in n   t t- -1 1   
(-0.76)  -  (-1.04)  - 
O Ob bs se er rv va at ti io on ns s    28  28  28  28 
R R2 2    0.91  0.91  0.92  0.92 
T Te es st t   F F       30.02  35.66  33.12  38.32 

















Estimated Results: Microeconomic Regressions 
Tax Rate 
 





































Dependent Variable: Investment as a % of fixed assets 
Variable  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
0.980**  0.980**  0.990** 
Constant 
(23.74)  (23.70)  (23.65) 
0.001  0.001  0.002  Operating Profits/Total Assets in t-1 
(0.09)  (0.08)  (0.12) 
-0.210**  -0.209**  -0.198**  Total Liabilities/Total Assets in t-1 
(-2.96)  (-2.95)  (-2.78) 
-0.479**  -0.434**  -0.429** 
Tax Rate 
(-2.91)  (-2.24)  (-2.22) 
-0.026**  -0.026**  -0.027** 
Interest Rate 
(-3.43)  (-3.45)  (-3.48) 
0.006*  0.007*  0.006* 
Real GDP Growth 
(1.88)  (1.93)  (1.73) 
-  -0.002  -0.005 
Real Exchange Rate Volatility 
-  (-0.45)  (-0.95) 
-  -  -0.002 
Change in Investment Deflator 
-  -  (-1.45) 
Number of Observations  1795  1795  1795 
Number of groups  87  87  87 
R-squared  0.071  0.071  0.072 
F-statistic  25.91  21.62  18.84 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000  0.000  0.000 








Estimated Results: Microeconomic Regressions 
Tax Burden 
 
Dependent Variable: Investment as a % of fixed assets 
Variable  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4 
1.012**  1.014**  1.018**  1.016** 
Constant 
(21.97)  (21.97)  (21.79)  (22.04) 
0.006  0.006  0.006  0.006 
Operating Profits/Total Assets in t-1 
(0.39)  (0.38)  (0.40)  (0.39) 
-0.332**  -0.331**  -0.327**  -0.335** 
Total Liabilities/Total Assets in t-1 
(-4.18)  (-4.16)  (-4.09)  (-4.21) 
-0.001**  -0.001**  -0.001**   -0.001** 
Taxes/Before-Tax Profits 
(-2.78)  (-2.79)  (-2.79)  (-2.77) 
-  -  -  -0.333* 
Tax Rate 
-  -  -  (-1.87) 
-0.046**  -0.044**  -0.044**  -0.033** 
Interest Rate 
(-9.40)  (-8.11)  (-8.11)  (-3.84) 
0.012**  0.011**  0.011**  0.007**  Real GDP Growth  
(4.83)  (4.68)  (4.45)  (2.02) 
-  -0.003  -0.004  -  Real Exchange Rate Volatility 
-  (-0.73)  (-0.89)  - 
-  -  -0.001  - 
Change in Investment Deflator 
-  -  (-0.54)  - 
Number of Observations  1501  1501  1501  1501 
Number of groups  87  87  87  87 
R-squared  0.084  0.084  0.084  0.086 
F-statistic  25.76  21.54  18.50  22.08 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 

















Private Investment (%GDP)  and the Corporate Income Tax Rate
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